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ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES AS SET FORTH IN UTAH
CASE
LAW,
DENNIS
JACOBSEN,
AS GENERAL
CONTRACTOR, DID
NOT RETAIN THE REQUISITE
ACTUAL SUPERVISION OR CONTROL OVER THE WORK OF
BRUCE RING
SO AS TO INVOKE A STATUTORY
EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE
RELATIONSHIP
AS BETWEEN
JACOBSEN AND RING, NOR BETWEEN JACOBSEN AND
MARK PUGH.
As stated in appellants' brief in chief, in
whether

or

not

Mark

Jacobsen, it is

Pugh

necessary

was
to

a

order to discern

statutory employee of Dennis

examine

the

relationship between

Jacobsen and Bruce Ring. That is, in accordance with Sect. 35-1-42
U.C.A., Dennis Jacobsen may be deemed a statutory employer of Pugh
(an

employee

supervision or

of

Bruce

control

appellant's contention

Ring) if Jacobsen retained the requisite
over

the

work

of

Bruce

Ring.

It is

that Jacobsen lacked the requisite control

or

supervision

which

would

make

him

a

statutory

employer.

In determining whether or not the requisite supervision or control
was present, it is
facts.

And

necessary

to

look

at

the

totality

of the

whether a worker is an employee within the meaning of

the workmen's compensation

laws

requires

statutory standard to the facts,

bar, it is

necessary

among the
to

application

of a

Bennett v. Industrial Commission

of Utah, 762 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986).
relationships existing

the

Thus, in

various parties

apply

the

standards

determining the
in the case at
of Sect. 35-1-42

U.C.A. to the pertinent facts.
Inasmuch as

appellants' brief in chief cites many Utah cases

which have examined the
necessary to

standards

of

thoroughly re-examine

to say that the cases cited

Sect. 35-1-42,

those cases here.

in appellants'

brief in

it

is not

Suffice it
chief stand

for the proposition that in order for one to be deemed a statutory
employer, he must have retained the right to
the

execution

of

the

work

control or supervise

for which he has contracted.

While

appellants believe that the facts in the case at bar are such that
the

standards

finding

enunciated

of

no

in

appellants

statutory

respondents contend

that the

employer/employee

Appellants take

did not overrule Graham
(Utah 1984),

nor any

cases require a
relationship,

cases cited in appellants' brief in

chief are "irrelevant in light of
page 7.)

cited

Bennett".

(Respondents' brief,

exception to this contention.

v. R. Thorne
of the

Foundation,

675

Bennett
P.2d 1196

other cases cited by Jacobsen/State

Insurance Fund.
2

Further, a close reading of Bennett and the authorities cited
therein reveals that Bennett does not necessitate a finding that a
statutory

employer/employee

relationship

exists

in the present

controversy.
Respondents5 claim, "[T]he Jacobsen/Ring relationship clearly
meets the

supervision or control standard enunciated in Bennett,"

(Respondent brief, page 7 ) .
not

actually

decide

an

It should

issue

be noted

with

which

that Bennett did

we

are

concerned.

(Bennett decided the issue concerning a relationship between a sub
contractor

and

his

"employee";

Sect. 35-1-42 (2) and set

The Court did, however, analyze

forth principles

to be

used in deter-

mining the relationship between a general contractor and a subcontractor's employee).
standards which
contractor

-

However, even

the Bennett

applying

Court discussed

subcontractor

the

principles and

regarding a general

relationship,

the

Jacobsen/Ring

relationship does not meet the supervision or control standard set
forth.

That is, Jacobsen

vision or

control over

failed to
the work

retain the

of Ring

necessary super-

so as to bring about a

statutory employer/employee relationship.
Respondent
Bennett

decision

relies

upon

which

and

states,

emphasizes
"[T]he

term

a

portion

of the

'supervision

or

control' requires only that the general contractor retain ultimate
control over
becomes:
that it

the project."

726 P.2d

How much control must the
can be

said that

3

Thus the question

general contractor

he retained

project?

at 432.

retain so

ultimate control over the

Although

the

Bennett

Court

never

question, it appears that the "control"
tion of

control over

more than

expressly answered this
contemplated is

merely the

a reten-

ends to be attained.

That is, ultimate control embodies a retention of control over the
means used

to attain

the desired end result.

be gleaned through an

examination of

This inference can

the authority

cited by the

Bennett Court.
Immediately

after

stating,

"• . . 'supervision or control'

requires only that the general contractor
over the

project,"

retain ultimate control

726 P.2d at 432, the Bennett Court cites with

approval a portion of the opinion in Nochta
sion, 7

Ariz. App. 166, 436

v. Industrial Commis-

P.2d 944 (1968).

Although the cited

portion of the Nochta opinion speaks in generalities,
Court did

hold that

in order

for one

to be

the Arizona

deemed a statutory

employer, the alleged employer must retain control over the method
of reaching

the required

result.

The

Bennett Court cited three

different Arizona cases in its decision,
no

way

suggest

that

Arizona

and while

case law is determinative of this

issue, the frequency with which Arizona cases are
this Courts
Courts.

It

appellants in

cited indicates

readiness to accept the standards enunciated by those
should

be

noted

Sect. 35-1-42, U.C.A. contains

that

Arizona's

language almost

counterpart

to

identical to that

contained in the Utah statute.
The Bennett Court also cited
specific factors

to look

a

Utah

case

which enumerated

at in determining the right to control.

4

The Court cited Harry

L. Young and

Sons v. Ashton,

538 P.2d 316

(Utah 1975) with approval:
Many factors have beeii applied in deteriftiivi^g
the right to control. Among those factors are
actual supervision, the method of payment, the
furnishing of equipment for the worker, and
the right to terminate the worker. . • . Although these factors are not inclusive, they
are relevant in many cases, including this
case.
726 P.2d at 430.
Although the above quoted portion

of

the

opinion

was made

while discussing the relationship existing between a subcontractor
and his 'employee', the same standards
cable in

determining the

'subcontractor'.

and principles

relationship between a contractor and a

This is so because the focus of

situations revolves

are appli-

around how

person retains over another.

inquiry in both

much 'control or supervision* one

It is this retention

of control (or

lack thereof) which defines the relationship.
Applying
readily

these

apparent

supervision or

various

that

Jacobsen

various factors

did

to

the case at bar, it is

retain the requisite
I
control which would make him a statutory employer.

Inasmuch as appellants' brief
of the

factors

in chief

to the

not

discusses the application

case at bar, it is unnecessary to

reiterate that application here.
Respondent also refers to a portion
which refers

of the

Bjennett decision

to Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 110 Utah 309,

172 P.2d 136 (Utah 1946).

Citing

stated:

5

Parkinson,

the

Rennet t Court

Therefore, as long as a subcontractor's work
is a part or process of the general contractor's business, an inference arises that
the general contractor has retained supervision or
control over the subcontractor
sufficient
to
meet
the
requirement of
Sect. 35-1-42(2).
While the

Bennett Court,

that an inference of the

in referring

requisite

to Parkinson, stated

control

may

arise,

a close

reading of Parkinson indicates that the inference arising is in no
way set in concrete.
easily be refuted.

That is, even if an inference arises, it may
What the Parkinson Court actually said, was:

If the work to be done is a part or process of
the employer's business, it is more probable
that the employer would closely supervise that
part or process and therefore more probable
that he has the right to control how the
workman does his job.
Likewise, the probability of the employer directing the workman's activities are much greater where there
is no definite job or piece of work contracted
for than when he agrees to do a specific job
and especially when such specific job is the
type of work he does in his independent
calling.
172 P.2d at 140.
Thus, while

perhaps it is more probable that when a piece of

work is a part or process
retain the

of

the

employer's

he will

power to control the 'employee', an examination of the

totality of the facts is necessary.
Parkinson

business,

case

is

over

40

It should

years

spoken of is not as probable today as
because trades

be noted

that the

old and that the probability
40 years

ago.

This

is so

have become more specialized in the past 40 years*

That is, today a contractor who subcontracts some of his work to a
person

specialized

in

a

field

is

less

likely

to retain the

requisite supervision
probably

more

or

highly

control

because

qualified

and

the

subcontractor is

experienced

than the con-

tractor .
It should

also be

noted that

the Parkinson

Court made the

following statement:
It is when the employer can not only determine
where the work shall be done but how it should
be executed that the relationship is that of
employer-employee.
172 P.2d at 140.
Accordingly, this supports
the

requisite

retention

the

means to

contention that

of supervision and control contemplates

not merely control over the end
control the

appellants'

result,

but

rather

a

right to

be used in attaining that end, or the right

to determine how the work should be executed.
The only case which
contention

that

respondents

Jacobsen

was

irrelevant in

assumption.
cases

cited

by

cited

light of

First of all,

in

Bennett.

Bennett did

appellant.

in

appellants'

the Court

not over-rule

relationship

supervision or

stated that

not discuss

which it referred, it

any of the

meets

the super-

Bennett did not

control standard.

Rather,

the supervision or control standard should

be determined in light of the
Bennett did

brief in

This is an erroneous

vision or control standard enunciated in Bennett.
forth a

of their

Second, respondents are in error in

contending that the Jacobsen/Ring

expressly set

support

a statutory employer, is Bennett.

Respondents state that the cases
chief are

cite

is

principles discussed.

with any
necessary
7

Inasmuch as

definiteness the principles to
to

delve

further

into the

authorities cited

by Bennett.

ities cited in Bennett
employer, he

All of the aforementioned author-

indicate that

must retain

for one

the right

method used to attain the end

to be

a statutory

to control

or supervise the

Clearly,

Jacobsen did not

result.

retain this control and therefore he is not a statutory employer.
In

sum,

while

Bennett

stands for the proposition that one

must retain ultimate control over the
statutory employer,

project to

"ultimate control,"

ities cited, contemplates the right to

be classified a

in light

of the author-

control the

means used in

reaching the desired end.
POINT II
THE UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND STEPS INTO THE
SHOES OF A DEFAULTING EMPLOYER AND INCURS
LIABILITY FOR COMPENSATION BENEFITS PRIOR TO A
STATUTORY EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY ARISING.
It is appellants' contention
Fund

was

created

for

the

that

purpose

the
of

Uninsured Employers'

paying and assuring the

payment of benefits to employees of insolvent employers.
appellants contend

that the liability of the Uninsured Employers'

Fund will come into play prior
In

Larson,

Workmens

Professor Larson

notes

that

maintain that because they are

cannot

are statutory

incur

exhausted.

is,

the

of a

Law,
usual

statutory employer.

Section

49.11

liability

at 9.2,

of

a statu-

In accordance with this, appellants
only

secondarily

liable,

(if in

employers) Jacobsen/Sbate Insurance Fund

liability
That

to that

Compensation

tory employer is "secondary."

fact they

Further,

until
Bruce

incurs primary liability.

If

all
Ring

primary

has been

as Pugh's immediate employer,

Ring is
8

liability

insolvent, then

the Unin-

sured Employers'
surety.

Fund steps into the shoes of Ring, and acts as a

If the Uninsured Employers' Fund

funding to

pay the

does not

have adequate

awarded benefits, then the statutory employer

becomes responsible for the benefits, as its liability

is second-

ary to that of Bruce Ring and the Fund.
In respondents'
in as the surety

brief, it

for

a

is argued

defaulting

that if the Fund steps

employer,

employer escapes liability altogether.

then

a statutory

Respondents cite a portion

of the Industrial Commission's finding wherein it stated:
If the
Legislature
had
jwanted the
[Uninsured Employers Fund] to take the place
of 'statutory'
employers, the legislature
would have repealed the statutory employers'
section of U.C.A. 35-1-42, when the [Uninsured
Employers Fund] legislation was passed. As
the legislature did not do so, the Commission
finds the [Uninsured Employers Fund] was not
intended to
replace
statutory employers.
(R. 169).
The contention

made by respondent and the above statement of

the Industrial Commission are not correct.
The Uninsured Employers' Fund incurring liability
statutory employer

is not

tantamount to

employer of liability altogether.
necessary
employer's

funds

to

secondary

pay

the

liability

relieving the statutory

Rather, if

benefits
comes

prior to a

due,
into

the Fund

lacks the

then the statutory
play.

This

is in

accordance with the purpose of broadening the base of liability so
as to provide adequate compensation to
is,

statutory

employer

Rather, the liability
those who

liability

merely

are primarily

is

surfaces

liable.
9

the injured

worker.

That

not abandoned altogether.
after

the

exhaustion of

Thus, a general contractor will

still

be

concerned

will procure the
workers.

This

hiring

appropriate
is so

aware of the fact
depleted of

with

compensation

because a

that if

its funds,

responsible subcontractors who

statutory employer

for their

will be well

Employers5 Fund becomes

the Uninsured

it is

protection

the statutory employer who becomes

ultimately liable.
Respondents also contend that if the legislature had intended
for the

Uninsured Employers

Fund to

incur liability

statutory employer, then the legislature would
adequate funding
of the

Uninsured

appellants*
the

and reserves.
Employers

belief

Uninsured

that

the Fund

have provided more

That there is inadequate funding

Fund

is

mere

speculation.

Fund's
was to

potential
be funded.

liability

prior to

Further, one cannot

assume that the legislature did not consider the
of statutory

Tt is

the legislature took into consideration

Employers'

determining how

prior to a

back-up position

employers when it considered the fiscal stability of

the Fund.
CONCLUSION
Appellants contend that based

upon the

authorities cited in

appellants' brief iji chief, as well as the standards enunciated in
Bennett, Dennis Jacobsen did
supervision over

the work

tory employer-employee
supervision

and

not

retain

ultimate

power or

of Bruce Ring so as to invoke a statu-

relationship.

control

the

contemplates

The
the

method used in attaining the desired result.

10

requisite retention of
right to control the

Further,

even

if

Jacobsen

is

deemed

employer, his liability is secondary and

to

be

comes into

a statutory
play only if

the Uninsured Employers' Fund is insolvent.
DATED this _^_

day of January, 1987.
BLACK & MOORE

puM).
JAMES R. BLACK
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